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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Transaction Costs on Greenhouse Gas Emission  
Mitigation for Agriculture and Forestry. (May 2011) 
Seong Woo Kim, B.A., Chung-Ang University; 
M.S., Seoul National University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
 
 Climate change and its mitigation is rapidly becoming an item of social concern.  
Climate change mitigation involves reduction of atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations through emissions reduction and or sequestration enhancement 
(collectively called offsets).  Many have asked how agriculture and forestry can 
participate in mitigation efforts.  Given that over 80 percent of greenhouse gas emissions 
arise from the energy sector, the role of agriculture and forestry depends critically on the 
costs of the offsets they can achieve in comparison with offset costs elsewhere in the 
economy.  A number of researchers have examined the relative offset costs but have 
generally looked only at producer level costs.  However there are also costs incurred 
when implementing, selling and conveying offset credits to a buyer.  Also when 
commodities are involved like bioenergy feedstocks, the costs of readying these for use 
in implementing an offset strategy need to be reflected.  This generally involves the 
broadly defined category of transaction costs.  This dissertation examines the possible 
effects of transactions costs and storage costs for bioenergy commodities and how they 
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affect the agriculture and forestry portfolio of mitigation strategies across a range of 
carbon dioxide equivalent prices.  The model is used to simulate the effects with and 
without transactions and storage costs.  Using an agriculture and forestry sector model 
called FASOMGHG, the dissertation finds that consideration of transactions and storage 
costs reduces the agricultural contribution total mitigation and changes the desirable 
portfolio of alternatives.  In terms of the portfolio, transactions costs inclusion 
diminishes the desirability of soil sequestration and forest management while increasing 
the bioenergy and afforestation role.  Storage costs diminish the bioenergy role and favor 
forest and sequestration items.  The results of this study illustrate that transactions and 
storage costs are important considerations in policy and market design when addressing 
the reduction of greenhouse gas concentrations in climate change related decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
          Climate change and the social reaction to it has become a widely discussed issue.  
The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) asserts that climate change 
effects are likely inevitable, may be irreversible and that resultant damages are uncertain 
(IPCC, 2007a).  Furthermore they and the number of other scientific groups recommend 
that mitigative actions be taken to reduce GHG (Greenhouse Gas) emissions (IPCC, 
2007b; National Academy of Sciences, 2010).           
          Mitigation of GHG emissions has become a widely discussed policy alternative.  
In 1992, 165 signed the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change), which is an organization aimed at achieving long-term stabilization of GHG 
concentrations in atmosphere.  In particular, the UNFCCC seeks to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations at a level that would protect from dangerous human interference with the 
climate in 1992 (United Nations, 1992).   
          Many researchers have examined ways to achieve such stabilization (see for 
example the work by the Energy Modeling Forum and the review in IPCC 2007b).  As 
part of this total effort a number of researchers have examined the potential participation 
in GHG mitigation by agriculture and forestry. 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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          Given that over 80 percent of the emissions arises from the energy sector EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency) the role of agriculture and forestry depends critically 
on the costs of the emission reductions they generate in comparison with costs of 
generating emission reductions elsewhere in the economy.  Consequently a number of 
researchers in examining agriculture and forestry participation in GHG emission 
reductions economic contributions have looked at the relative costs of potential 
strategies.  However in looking at this most analysts have looked only at the producer 
level costs.  But producer level costs are only part of the story as there are costs incurred 
when implementing, selling and conveying offset credits to a buyer like a power plant 
needing GHG offsets.  In particular, the offsets still need to be conveyed to the buyer 
and where commodities are involved, the costs of readying these for use in 
implementing the emission offset strategy need to be reflected.  This generally involves 
the broadly defined category of transactions costs.  Hahn and Hester (1989) indicate that 
the magnitude of transaction costs will have important consequences not only for the 
size and efficiency of markets, but also for their overall structure.  Furthermore Stavins 
(1995a) and Atkinson at el. (1991) review cases where high transactions costs have 
caused strategies to not be implemented.  This dissertation investigates the role of 
transactions and storage costs as they affect the potential cost of agriculturally based 
GHG mitigation options. 
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Objective  
          This dissertation examines the possible effects of transactions costs and storage 
costs for bioenergy commodities and how they affect the agriculture and forestry 
portfolio of desirable on GHG mitigation strategies given a carbon dioxide equivalent 
price.  In particular, this work will look at two items; 1) the effects of transactions costs 
in general and those that vary by GHG mitigation strategy, 2) the effects of storage costs 
and losses for bioenergy commodities.  In doing this analysis, we consider the impact 
that factoring in transaction and storage costs/storage losses have on the optimal 
portfolio of GHG emissions and the total volume of the emission offsets it can be 
generated at any given carbon dioxide equivalent price.  
 
Plan of Dissertation 
          The dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter I provides the introduction. 
Chapter II discusses the background for agricultural and forest reconsideration in 
emission reductions including carbon sequestration and introduces the conceptual 
framework for consideration of transaction costs.  Chapter III considers transactions 
costs empirically as they influence the economic portfolio of agricultural and forest tree 
GHG emission reductions.  Chapter IV reviews the literature on possible storage costs 
and examines the empirical effects of including storage costs by considering dry matter 
losses with indoor or outdoor forms of storage.  Chapter V summarizes the overall 
dissertation findings and draws conclusions and implications plus also discusses 
limitations and recommends further research directions. 
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CHAPTER II 
ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTIONS COSTS 
 
Introduction 
          Transaction costs were first defined to discuss possible forms of organization by 
Coase (1937).  In the context of institution, transaction costs are the costs of running the 
economic system (Arrow, 1969) or an expense of organizing and participating in a 
market and in a government policy (Gorden, 1994).  Coase (1960) also introduced the 
concept of transaction cost in an environmental context.  Falconer (2000) defines 
transaction costs in an agricultural context as expenditure for assistance from agricultural 
or conservation consultants, mapping, and telephone calls related to costs of 
participating in a market and labor expenses for information search.  In this study, 
transactions costs are defined as costs to a firm incurred in making an economic 
exchange.  When products are bought in the market, only the market price of the product 
is paid, however, there can be additional costs that are incurred to conduct the 
transaction and receive the product.   
          Transaction costs may be divided into three general categories, search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policy and enforcement costs.  
Many studies have discussed these types of transaction costs.  Specifically, Rasmusen 
(2001) details transaction costs as taxes, registry fees, brokers’ fees, costs for 
monitoring, reporting and third party verification, legal fees, and fees imposed by 
government regulation.  Griffin (1991) points out that information generating costs are 
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incurred even when there are no transactions.  Monitoring and enforcement costs can 
also be significant, but these costs are typically borne by the responsible governmental 
authority rather than trading partners (Stavins, 1995b).  Michaelowa (2002, 2005) define 
the transaction cost of GHG projects under the KP (Kyoto Protocol) at three different 
stages: 
             • Pre-project implementation costs -- search costs, negotiation costs, baseline 
determination costs, approval costs, validation costs, review costs, and 
registration costs 
             • Pre-project implementation -- monitoring costs, verification costs, review 
costs, certification, and enforcement costs. 
            • Trading cost -- transfer costs and registration costs. 
 
          Typically, transaction costs are negligible.  However, there are two circumstances 
in which transaction costs might be relatively high and need to be considered: when 
transfer is expensive because of technological reasons; and, when institutions are 
designed to impede trade (Stavins, 1995a).  High transaction costs of in EPA’s 
Emissions Trading Program are a good example.  In this case, transaction costs are high 
because of environmentalists’ intended effect of making it difficult to trade (Hahn, 
1989).  Under such conditions, transaction costs should be measured and taken into 
consideration by decision makers, especially for policy-making purposes.  Fang et al. 
(2005) emphasizes the importance of including public sector costs in assessing policy 
options.  McCann and Easter (2000) analyzed the public sector transaction costs of no-
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point source pollution abatement in agriculture.  Agricultural programs have traditionally 
exhibited substantial transactions costs. 
          The objective of this chapter is to review how transaction costs have been 
estimated or measured in previous studies and provide an economic discussion of 
transaction costs of GHG emission reductions in agriculture. 
 
Literature Review 
          If transaction costs are to be incorporated into policy evaluation, they need to be 
measured (McCann and Easter, 1999).  Two methods are used to estimate transaction 
costs.  For one method, Williamson (1993) suggests that researchers may be able to 
measure a lower bound of transaction costs indirectly.  For the other method, transaction 
cost can also be estimated based on the difference between the supply and demand 
curves (Hearne and Easter, 1995; Archibald and Renwick, 1998). 
          Few empirical studies have examined transaction costs by using econometric 
techniques.  Stavins (1993) considered three reasonable functional forms – constant, 
increasing, and decreasing marginal transaction costs.  The existence of transaction cost 
implies that the performance of a tradable GHG permit system will depart, possibly 
substantially, from the least-cost ideal.  Akinson and Tientenber (1991) examined cases 
where the transaction costs caused market participation to be substantially lower than 
was expected.   
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          Measurement and estimation of transaction costs are different depending on 
different research contexts.  Table 1 lists how transaction costs are measured or 
estimated in previous studies.  A discussion of the methods follows.  
           For GHG ETS (Emission Trading Scheme), few studies that report the marginal 
cost of producing GHG offsets have taken account of transaction costs.  For example, 
Jaraite et al. (2009) report an average regulatory cost of participation in the first phase of 
the EU ETS is about $223,000 per entity with about $75,000 for small emitters, 
$156,000 for medium emitters, and $821,000 for large emitters.  In per tone of CO2 
emissions terms, the average regulatory cost is $0.12 per tone of CO2 with $3.08 for 
small emitters, $1.33 for medium emitters and $0.08 for large emitters.  The reported 
costs include early implementation costs (setup costs, including time and staff 
commitment, consultancy costs, and some capital costs, mainly for metering equipment), 
monitoring, reporting and verification costs (staff costs, consulting costs, auditing costs) 
and costs of trading (costs of transacting).  
          In an agri-environmental context, Falconer (2000), Falconer and Sounders (2002), 
and McCann et al. (2005) estimate the magnitudes of regulatory cost by doing empirical 
analysis.  Falconer (2000) estimates overall regulatory costs that are related to the 
certification and auditing of organic farming in some EU countries range between $118 
and $155 per hectare.  Falconer and Sounders (2002) examined the cost of contract 
negotiation and transactions of conservation payments for agricultural land in England 
with estimates between $950 and $3,470 per hectare.  Although these estimates are not a  
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Table 1   Methods of Measurements of Transaction Costs Reported 
Article Data Source Sample 
Size 
Definition of Transaction 
Costs 
Project Type Estimates 
Coase(1960), 
Williamson(1985), 
Oates(1986),  
North(1990), 
Stavins(1995b) 
  Number and Diversity of 
Agents, Technology, Policy 
under Consideration, Level of 
Uncertainty, Asset Specificity, 
Institutional Environment, 
Amount of Abatement, Size of 
the Transaction 
  
Laura 
McCanns(2000) 
Surveys by 
NRCS 
1,446 Research and Information, 
Enactment, Design and 
Implementation, Support and 
Administration, Prosecution, 
Monitoring 
Resource 
Conservation  
38% of 
total 
conservatio
n cost 
($12.52 
/Acre)  
Fichtner et 
al.(2003) 
AIJ 64 Technical Assistance, Follow-
up, Administration, Reporting 
32 Energy 
efficiency, 27 
renewable 
energy,   3 
forestry,  
1 afforestation,  
1 agriculture 
$0.05~261 
per tCO2 
Mooney(2003) Empirical  & 
Estimated 
Costs by LLC 
3,146 Measuring and Monitoring Forestry 3% to 
10.6% of 
the value of 
a C-Credit 
Michaelowa et al. 
(2002) 
Swedish 
AIJ 
51 Normalized Technical 
Assistance and Administration 
RE, EE, Mix $0.16~15.5 
per tCO2* 
Michaelowa and 
Jotzo `(2005) 
PCF 4 Pre-implementation, 
Implementation(first 2years) 
and Certification 
Agriculture, 
Electricity 
$0.02~0.09 
per tCO2* 
Antinori and 
Sathaye(2006) 
Surveys using 
LBNL 
spreadsheet 
41 Search, Negotiation, 
Feasibility, Monitoring and 
Verification, Regulatory 
Approval 
Forestry,  
fuel switching,  
fuel capture, 
renewable,  
energy efficiency 
$0.03~4.46 
per tCO2 
Galik et al.(2009) Calhoun 
Experimental 
Forest Data 
17,172 Design, Implement, Monitor 
an Offset Project, Measuring 
Verifying, Registering 
1 
Energy(1605(b)) 
4 Forestry(GFC, 
CCX, CAR, 
VCS) 
$10.23 per 
mtCO2e 
English et. 
al(2009) 
Carbon Prices 
by EPA 
 Quantification and 
Verification, Probability of 
Leakage, Probability of 
Natural Event, Verification 
and Documentation, 
Aggregation, Documentation 
and Monitoring 
Change in tillage 
practice,  
Afforestation,  
Planting 
herbaceous 
energy crops,  
Methane capture 
40% 
 
30% 
20% 
 
20% 
* Assuming a Swedish krona exchange rate of 8 krona per US dollar. 
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direct indicator of the regulatory cost involved in the GHG ETS, they provide some 
senses of the likely cost of regulation that may be expected in the agricultural sector. 
          Beyond regulatory costs, trading costs, such as cost of listing, brokerage, and 
transaction settlement, can also be significant.  According to ECX (2009), the cost of 
trading for small and medium emitters is about $0.038 per allowances in the EU ETS 
Alston and Hurd (1990) estimate that transaction costs of administering the farm 
program ranged from 25 to 50 cents for each dollar distributed.  McCann and Easter 
(2000) find that the magnitude of transaction costs is about 38 percent of total costs or 
over 50 percent of direct payments for conservation efforts.  Fitchtner et al. (2003) find 
the mean share of total project transaction costs is 13 percent for energy efficiency 
projects and about 20 percent for renewable energy projects.  Michaelowa (2002, 2005) 
reports the total transaction cost of a large project reaches 0.4 ~ 0.9$/t CO2 and 
0.5~1.4$/t CO2 for a small project with around 14 percent spent on transaction costs and 
a further 14 percent on taxes in their standard research scenario. 
          In some cases, transaction costs vary due to the type of project.  Antinori and 
Sathaye (2006) estimate how transaction costs change due to different types of project 
by considering projects in energy efficiency, forestry, renewable energy, fuel switching, 
and landfill gas based on project type, market maturity, and location.  They found that 
the total transaction costs were significantly lower for forestry projects and mature 
markets and higher for projects in South America.  Transaction costs, in their study, 
ranged from $0.03 per tonne of carbon dioxide for large projects to $4.05 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide for smaller ones, with a weighted average $0.26 per tonne of carbon 
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dioxide for all projects.  The finding of economies of scale suggests that small projects 
have cost barriers to overcome.  Galik et el. (2009) analyze a hypothetical forest 
management GHG offset project.  They consider high and low values for key transaction 
cost parameters with project sizes of 100, 1000, or 10,000 hectares.  They found that the 
average transaction costs are much lower in larger projects with a mean transaction cost 
of $10.23 per metric ton CO2e.  This was because certain fixed costs remain constant, 
while variable costs decrease per unit area for larger projects (Mooney et al. 2004).  
Because of the high transaction cost and low absolute volumes of sequestered carbon, it 
is unlikely that small landowners will participate in a carbon market directly.  
           McCann (1997) analyzed Natural Resource Conservation Service cost share and 
technical assistance data and found that transaction costs represented 38 percent of the 
total conservation cost.  Wallis and North (1986) estimated the transaction cost “sector” 
for the U.S. and found that transaction costs in public and private sector amounted to 
about ¼ to ½ of GNP.  English et al. (2009) estimate the GHG offsets transaction costs 
discounts of the activities of agricultural and forestry to EPA’s carbon prices: 40 percent 
from tillage practices, 30 percent from afforestation, 20 percent from methane capture, 
and 20 percent from production of bioenergy crops.          
         Mooney et al. (2003) conclude that:  
            • Efficiency of a project depends on the price of C credits 
            • Transaction costs are the largest in areas with greatest heterogeneity, and 
            • Transaction costs are less than 3 percent of the value of a C-credit in their case 
study. 
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           Transaction costs have number of components that are discussed below 
(expanding upon McCarl, 2003, lecture notes). 
 
Assembly Costs 
          Emitting entities such as power or petroleum company would likely need large 
quantities of offsets (with for example emissions of large power conglomerates in the 
100s of millions of tons) compared to what a farmer could produce.  It is not 
economically efficient for an offset purchaser in quest of 100,000 tons to deal with a 
single farmer.  An offset of 100,000 tons at an average sequestration rate of 0.25 tons per 
acre (as found in West and Post) would require 400,000 acres.  Considering a rough 
average farm size of 400 acres (the average of U.S. farm was 418 acres in 2007), this 
offset would involve 1,000 farmers.  Thus, there would be a role for intermediaries 
(brokers or aggregators) in the market who would aggregate emission offsets generated 
by agricultural producers into a large enough groups to stimulate power plant interests 
and in turn sell permits.  Costs arise in such a process. 
          Assembly costs include not only initial assembly but in the longer run any costs 
incurred in keeping the group of farmers together and dispersing payments.  This 
element of transactions cost is potentially very expensive and also may depend on the 
implementation regime.  For example, governments might aggregate group of farmers 
and in turn sell offset permits.  Crop insurance is such a scheme and there transactions 
costs are about 25 percent for brokers.  
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Measurement and Monitoring 
          Conveyance will also require measurement and monitoring to establish that offsets 
are being produced and continue to be produced.  This requires the development of a low 
cost measurement and monitoring approach that involves a sampling based scheme 
integrating field level measurement, computer simulation, and remote sensing on some 
dynamic and geographically appropriate basis.   
 
Certification 
          Certain bodies may develop and certify offset quantity estimates for practices and 
then monitor that the practice continues.  For example a government rating could be 
established that indicates the number of offset credit from a tillage change under a set of 
circumstances.  Costs of obtaining such a certification as borne either by private parties 
or by the government would be transaction cost components. 
 
Enforcement 
          Contact enforcement may require hearings and the setup of an enforcement entity.  
Enforcement problems may arise between traders or within an assembly group.  Some 
estimate is needed of costs that will be encountered for the enforcement of permit 
contractual obligations.   
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Additional Adoption Cost Incentives 
          Cost may well be encountered involving education and training of agricultural 
producers on how to alter their practices so that they produce emission offsets most 
efficiently.  These costs need to be estimated in a way so that one does not double count 
the producer adoption benefits. 
 
Procedures for and Cost of Risk/Liability for Adverse Outcomes 
          Certain classes of offsets are volatile and subject to uncertainty including possible 
destruction by extreme whether events, fires, floods, etc.  Contracts may include 
procedures to insure against certain types of adverse outcomes.  These procedures may 
involve contract enforcement mechanisms, insurance, or some sort of planned safely 
margin where more offsets are produced than are sold enabling slack for unanticipated 
shortfalls. 
 
Transaction Costs in GHG Emission Reductions 
          Transaction costs can affect the potential GHG emissions offsets from agricultural 
sector.  It follows that the decision of whether or not to mandate agriculture in the ETS 
would crucially depend on whether the transaction cost plus production cost of GHG 
emission reductions in the sector are relatively high or relatively low compared to other 
sectors in the ETS.  Examining this issue is not an easy task.  Over the last ten years or 
so, a number of studies have estimated ‘abatement cost curves’ for GHG emission 
reductions in agriculture (Hyman et al. 2002, McCarl and Schneider 2000; Moran et al. 
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2008; Beach et al. 2008; McKinsey & Company 2009).  All of these studies have a 
common feature, that is, they consider abatement costs across regions and activities 
without considering transaction costs.   
          Another common feature is that they estimate the marginal abatement cost curve 
with a steeper slop when the reduction of GHG emissions from the agricultural sector 
goes 20 percent beyond current emission levels (Hyman et al. 2002).  Studies indicate 
that 5 to 25 percent of agricultural emission reductions, depending on agricultural 
activities and regions, could be achieved with a net benefit to farmers who undertake 
abatement.  Benefits to farmers could range from a few US dollars, up to several 
hundred US dollars per ton of CO2 equivalent (McCarl and Schneider 2000; Beach et al. 
2008; Moran et al. 2008; McKinsey & Company 2009).  This suggests that farmers 
could earn money from GHG offset production by using technologies, such as low crude 
protein diets, improved land and soil management, reduced nitrogen fertilizer 
application, and aerobic manure management techniques that reduce GHG emissions.  
 
Economic Consideration for Transaction Costs 
          McCann et al. (2005) argue that transaction costs have been considered similar to 
waste and as something to be minimized in the past.  “These costs are not ‘money down 
a rathole but are expended in exchange for transactions services (Randall, 1981)”.  
Nevertheless, different types and magnitudes of transaction costs could be efficient or 
inefficient, just as efficient or inefficient allocations of inputs can occur in a production 
process. 
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          Transaction costs are not usually considered in empirical evaluations of alternative 
environmental or natural resource policies, however, they are recognized in some 
theoretical work (Stavins, 1995a; Fullerton, 2001).  This lack of consideration is partly 
because transaction costs are difficult to define and measure in the real world.  This does 
not mean that transaction costs should be ignored however.  In fact, policy makers 
should make a point of taking into account transaction costs (including administrative 
costs) when making public policy decisions.  
          An economic analysis of transaction costs can be employed to investigate the 
effects on the competitiveness of individual mitigation strategies.  This analysis could be 
undertaken from a perspective of a benevolent regulator (a government agency) who 
aims to achieve a GHG emission reductions target at a minimum cost to the economy.  
Suppose a carbon price arises through some political or market process within the 
society, and it is assumed to be exogenous.  The cost of reducing GHG emissions 
pertaining to the regulated entities or sectors has three components: the actual cost of 
abatement, the cost of regulation including administration, monitoring, verification, 
enforcement, and the trading costs (Ancev, 2011). 
          For an individual GHG emitter, emissions may reduce to match an initial 
allocation of allowances and thus generate extra allowances that could be sold in the 
market.  On the other hand, emissions may not be reduced at all, thus creating an 
allowance deficit that requires the purchase of allowances in the market.  Those emitters 
who find it relatively less costly to reduce emissions would likely to do so and create an 
allowance surplus.  Those emitters who find it relatively more costly to reduce emissions 
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would therefore buy these surplus allowances.  In the case of GHG ETS and especially 
in the case of relatively small emitters that buy or sell small quantities of emission 
allowances, these transaction costs could be quiet substantial relative to the total value of 
the trade in allowances (Betz et al. 2010). 
 
Graphical Analysis 
          If the agricultural sector can achieve a significant reduction of its GHG emissions 
with transaction costs relatively lower compared to other sectors in an ETS, then 
transaction costs have a potential to create significant benefits to the agricultural sector 
when the cost of meeting a cap on GHG emissions has been imposed by an ETS.  
           If an economic sector is able to reduce emissions at a relatively low transaction 
costs plus any GHG offset production costs, the sector could reduce emissions to levels 
below those specified by the initial emission allowances allocated to the sector.  
Therefore, a surplus of allowances would be created that could be offered to the market 
at comparably low transaction costs.  
          However, if some other economic sector has to incur a relatively high transaction 
costs in addition to any GHG offset production costs firms seeking to reduce emissions 
will look at possibilities to purchase additional emission allowances at a lower total cost, 
rather than to reduce emissions on their own.  This will create an excess demand for 
emission allowances in the ETS and will result with higher prices for allowances, 
thereby inflating the overall cost of meeting the cap imposed by the ETS.  Figure 1 
shows the relationships of sectors with low marginal abatement costs and high marginal 
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abatement costs.  The supply curve of low marginal abatement costs is S1 and the supply 
curve of high marginal abatement costs is S2.  The supply and demand for emission 
reductions in the market are S and D, respectively.  The demand curve is buyer’s 
demand for GHG emission reductions offsets.  Agricultural producers and others who 
have excess emission reductions to sell as GHG offsets are depicted by the supply curve.   
 A buyer and a seller would trade the emission reductions at a price P and a quantity Q in 
the market, market equilibrium.  Also the firm of low transaction costs has emission 
reductions at q1 and the firm of high transaction costs has emission reductions at q2.  If 
transaction costs are incurred, the supply curve, S1, of the firm of low transaction costs 
shift to right to S1* and the supply curve, S2, of the firm of high transaction costs shift to 
the left to S2*.  Thus, the total supply curve, S, would shift to the left to S* decreasing 
the reduction of emissions.  In the overall market, the price of emission reductions would  
 
Figure 1   Effect of Transaction Costs on the Market for Emission Reductions   
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increase from P to P* and the quantity of emission reductions would decrease from Q to 
Q*.  Therefore, the effect of transaction costs is P* - P** which is the seller can have a 
new price P** and the buyer can pay a new price P*.  
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF GHG EMISSION REDUCTIONS: 
EFFECTS OF INCLUDING TRANSACTION COSTS IN ELIGIBILITY 
 
Introduction  
          The assembling of a group of farmers to sell carbon offsets to an emitting entity 
usually involves searching and negotiating activities as well as compliance processes 
such as monitoring and certification of GHG offsets.  Transaction costs would thus be 
incurred.  These transaction costs have been identified as one of the greatest hurdles for 
tradable permit systems (Hahn and Hester, 1989).  Their magnitude can have important 
consequences for the size and efficiency of, not only, the GHG offset market, but other 
markets as well.  Agricultural programs have traditionally exhibited substantial 
transaction costs as referenced above (Alston and Hurd, 1990; McCann and Easter, 
2000).  
          In fact, higher prices whether resulting from sizable transaction costs or not have 
consequences for many sectors of the economy through increased production costs and 
intermediate product prices (Schneider and McCarl, 2005).  For U.S. agriculture, higher 
fossil energy prices could raise farmers’ spending on diesel and other fossil fuels, 
irrigation water, farm chemicals, and grain drying.  Meanwhile, higher fossil fuel prices 
can make biofuels a more attractive alternative for fossil fuels and thus likely encourage 
biofuel feedstock production.  Schneider and McCarl (2005) examined both sides of this 
issue estimating the economic and environmental consequences of a carbon tax inducing 
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higher energy prices on United States agriculture.  To do this they employed a price 
endogenous agricultural sector model and solved that model over a range of carbon tax 
scenarios.  
          Agriculture has been considered as an industrial sector that can provide low-cost 
options for carbon sequestration to produce GHG offsets.  However, to get access to 
large volumes of carbon credits produced by the agricultural sector, differential 
transaction costs may be encountered.  How transaction costs influence the GHG 
emission reductions alternatives in agriculture is an important question.  The answer has 
implications for farmers’ carbon income and the role that agriculture can play in GHG 
sequestration.  This chapter aims to examine the impacts of transaction costs through 
adjusted carbon dioxide equivalent prices on the portfolio of agriculture activities in an 
emission reductions program.  Scenarios were developed for both full eligibility and 
limited eligibility, where eligibility relates to which GHG emission reductions and 
sequestration options is legitimate to provide carbon credits.  The current science of 
carbon sequestration suggests that not all practices should be eligible for carbon 
payments.  The limited eligibility scenarios include only GHG offsets that can be 
delivered with certainty only (Daigneault et al., 2009).   
 
Methodology and Assumptions 
          A mitigation strategy could alter corn production and corn prices which in turn 
may impact exports, livestock diets, livestock herd size, and manure production as well 
as land allocated to biofuels and forests.  Following McCarl and Schneider (2001), an 
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agriculture sector model that takes feedback effects into account was used for this study.  
The marginal GHG abatement cost curve describing the volume of GHG emission 
offsets deliver at different farmer-received carbon prices (i.e. market prices less 
brokerage fees and other transactions costs) was derived using this agricultural sector 
model.  This study assumes that carbon sequestered will not be released back into the 
atmosphere.  A wide spectrum of U.S. based agricultural responses to a net greenhouse 
gas mitigation effort is included in the analysis.  In particular, the role of agricultural 
sequestration efforts in the total portfolio of potential agricultural responses was 
examined at alternative carbon price levels. 
          The Forest and Agriculture Sector Optimization Model with Greenhouse Gases, 
FASOMGHG (Adams et al., 1996), 1 was used to simulate agricultural sector response to 
different carbon prices.       
          FASOMGHG mitigation estimates will generally not be as high as estimates found 
in the Richards and Stokes (2004) study, because FASOMGHG employs economic 
                                                 
1
 FASOMGHG is a partial equilibrium economic model of the U.S. forest and 
agriculture sectors, with land use competition between them, and linkages to 
international trade. FASOMGHG includes most major GHG mitigation options in U.S. 
forestry and agriculture; accounts for changes in CO2, CH4, and N2O from most 
activities; and tracks carbon sequestration and carbon losses over time. It also projects a 
dynamic baseline and reports all additional GHG mitigation as changes from that 
baseline. FASOMGHG tracks five forest product categories and over 2,000 production 
possibilities for field crops, livestock, and biofuels for private lands in the conterminous 
United States broken into 11 regions and 63 subregions.  Public lands are not included. 
FASOMGHG evaluates the joint economic and biophysical effects of a range of GHG 
mitigation scenarios, under which costs, mitigation levels, eligible activities, and GHG 
coverage may vary (US EPA, 2005). 
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feedback effects (e.g., timber and agricultural price effects) that will temper 
sequestration responses, in contrast to studies that estimate mitigation cost functions 
without market feedback effects (US EPA, 2005). 
          The basic approach of sector modeling used for comparing the relative desirability 
of alternative mitigation strategies involves estimation of the amount of GHG net 
emission reductions supplied in the U.S. agriculture and forestry sectors and the choice 
of strategies under alternative carbon prices.  Daigneault et al. (2009) introduced the 
concept of full eligibility and limited eligibility for GHG emission reductions strategies 
in the agricultural and forestry sectors, as detailed in Table 2 and Table 3.  Typically, 
N2O is not included in the full eligibility for agricultural GHG mitigation response. 
          The agricultural and forestry responses to GHG mitigation considered by this 
study are detailed below. 
 
Afforestation and Timberland Management 
          Forest based carbon sequestration can be stimulated by afforestation of 
agricultural lands, increasing rotation length, or changing management intensity through 
improved silvicultural practices.  The underlying data reflect regionally specific 
conversion of crop and pasture lands to and from trees as well as rotation and 
management changes. 
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Table 2   GHG Mitigation Strategies Full Eligibility Included in Analysis 
Sector/Strategy Basic Nature CO2 CH4 N2O 
Forestry     
Afforestation Sequestration X   
Reforestation Sequestration X   
Harvested Wood Products Sequestration X   
Agriculture     
Manure Management Emission  X X 
Crop Mix Alteration Emission, Sequestration X  X 
Crop Fertilization Alteration Emission, Sequestration X  X 
Crop Input Alteration Emission X  X 
Crop Tillage Alteration Emission, Sequestration   X 
Grassland Conversion Sequestration X   
Irrigated /Dry land Mix Emission X  X 
Rice Acreage Emission X X X 
Enteric fermentation Emission  X  
Livestock Herd Size Emission  X X 
Livestock System Change Emission  X X 
Biofuels     
Conventional Ethanol Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Cellulosic Ethanol Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Biodiesel Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Bioelectricity Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Source: Daigneault et al., “Implications of Offset Eligibility Provisions on GHG Mitigation for 
U.S. Forestry and Agriculture Carbon Sinks”, 2009. 
 
Biofuel Production 
          Offsets of GHG emission from fossil fuel usage were examined by considering 
substitution of biofuels for fossil fuels.  In particular, the model allows for poplar, 
switchgrass, and willow, crop residues and forest industry byproducts and waste to fuel 
electrical power plants and cellulostic ethanol plants, grains for conversion into ethanol 
and corn oil, soybean oil, waste cooking oil, and animal fats to make biodiesel.  The 
emission savings were computed on a BTU basis assuming biomass substitution for coal 
in power plants and ethanol substitution for gasoline.  In estimating emission offsets the  
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Table 3   GHG Mitigation Strategies Limited Eligibility Included in Analysis 
Sector/Strategy Basic Nature CO2 CH4 N2O 
Forestry     
Afforestation Sequestration X   
Reforestation Sequestration    
Harvested Wood Products Sequestration    
Agriculture     
Manure Management Emission  X X 
Crop Mix Alteration Emission, Sequestration X   
Crop Fertilization Alteration Emission, Sequestration X   
Crop Input Alteration Emission X   
Crop Tillage Alteration Emission, Sequestration    
Grassland Conversion Sequestration    
Irrigated /Dry land Mix Emission X   
Rice Acreage Emission X   
Enteric fermentation Emission    
Livestock Herd Size Emission    
Livestock System Change Emission    
Biofuels     
Conventional Ethanol Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Cellulosic Ethanol Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Biodiesel Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Bioelectricity Fossil Fuel Substitution X X X 
Source: Daigneault et al., “Implications of Offset Eligibility Provisions on GHG Mitigation for 
U.S. Forestry and Agriculture Carbon Sinks”, 2009. 
 
emissions accounting was the savings from not using traditional fossil fuels less the 
emissions from the energy involved in raising, hauling and processing the biofuels. 
 
Crop Fertilization Alteration 
          Nitrous oxide emissions are a byproduct of nitrogen fertilization.  In turn, nitrogen 
fertilization also influences carbon sequestration rates.  The IPCC good practice 
inventory guidelines were used to estimate nitrous oxide emissions per unit fertilizer 
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applied.  These formulas basically had about 1.25 percent of applied nitrogen being 
released as nitrous oxide. 
 
Crop Input Substitution 
          A number of the inputs used in crop production are fossil fuel based or embody 
substantial GHG emissions in their manufacture.  Carbon content estimates including 
upstream manufacturing carbon emissions were incorporated in the analysis for diesel, 
gasoline, natural gas, electricity, and fertilizers using the IPCC good practice guidelines. 
Thus, changes in crop mix, crop management, livestock numbers, etc. alter input use and 
resultant emissions patterns. 
 
Crop Mix Alteration 
          Not all crops emit GHGs equally because of differences in fertilizer applied, 
tillage practices, chemical inputs, harvest requirements, irrigation intensities, and post 
harvest processing among other factors.  The carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane 
emissions are affected by crop mix choices. 
 
Crop Tillage Alteration 
          Energy intensity and soil carbon content are sensitive to choice of tillage method.  
Emission estimates for soil carbon increments were derived from a 63 region, 10 crops, 
and 5 soil type crop simulation study using the EPIC (Erosion Productivity Impact 
Calculator) crop growth simulator (Williams et al., 1989).  The carbon sequestration 
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rates pertaining to tillage changes were average results for the first 70 years of EPIC 
results (2000-2070) from treating all U.S. croplands for sequestration.  Estimates were 
also developed on emissions from fossil fuels used in the alternative tillage systems as 
well as applying an altered mix of chemical inputs based on USDA Natural Resource 
Conservation Service production budgets. 
 
Grassland Conversion 
          Reversion of cropland back to grassland is another mitigation strategy considered.  
Such a reversion generally increases soil carbon and, in addition, affects nitrous oxide 
emissions by displacing fertilizer used in crop production. 
 
Irrigated / Dry Land Conversion 
          Changes in the allocation of land between irrigated and dry land usages affect soil 
carbon, nitrous oxide emissions, and fossil fuel use needed for water delivery and other 
crop production requirements. 
 
Livestock Management 
          Methane emissions per animal may be influenced by giving growth hormones to 
animals or by increasing the use of grain relative to forage in feeding.  Growth hormone 
based alternatives were incorporated based on EPA data.   
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Livestock Herd Size Alteration 
          Livestock produce methane and nitrous oxide generally as a function of the total 
size of the livestock herd through manure and ruminant enteric fermentation.  Thus a 
simple mitigation alternative is to cut the size of the total herd. 
 
Livestock Production System Substitution 
          Mitigation may be pursued through the substitution of livestock production 
systems for one another.  In the case of beef cattle, slaughter animals can be produced 
using either grazing or feedlot operations.  The relative GHG emission rate varies across 
these alternatives, i.e., feedlot production has lower per animal emissions. 
 
Manure Management 
          Manure is a source of methane and nitrous oxide.  The manure handling system 
can influence emissions.  For example methane emissions are greater the more water is 
involved in the system, however, methane recovery systems could be employed to 
harvest this additional methane. 
 
Rice Acreage 
          Decomposition of plant material in flooded rice fields leads to methane emissions.  
While alternative management systems may affect the amount of methane released, no 
consistent data are currently available.  Thus, the only rice related mitigation alternative 
examined here involves reductions in acreage.
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Table 4   Lists of All Greenhouse Gas Model Accounts 
GHG Type Context 
Forest_SoilSequest Carbon in forest soil 
Forest_LitterUnder Carbon in litter and understory of forests that remain forests 
Forest_ContinueTree Carbon in trees of forests that remain forests 
Forest_AfforestSoilSequest Carbon in forest soil of afforested forests 
Forest_AfforestLitterUnder Carbon in litter and understory of afforested forests 
Forest_AfforestTree Carbon in trees of afforested forests 
Forest_USpvtProduct Carbon from US private forests consumed producing forest products 
Forest_USpubProduct Carbon from US public forests consumed producing forest products 
Forest_CANProduct Carbon in US consumed but Canadian produced forest products 
Forest_USExport Carbon in US produced but exported forest products 
Forest_USImport Carbon in US consumed but imported from non-Canadian source 
Forest_USFuelWood Carbon in US consumed fuel wood 
Forest_USFuelResidue Carbon in US residue that is burned 
Forest_USresidProduct Carbon from US residues consumed producing forest products 
Forest_CANresidProduct Carbon from Canadian residues consumed producing forest products 
Carbon_For_Fuel Carbon emissions from forest use of fossil fuel 
Dev_Land_from_Ag Carbon on ag land after it moves into developed use 
Dev_Land_from_Forest Carbon on forest land after it moves into developed use 
AgSoil_CropSequest_Initial Carbon in cropped ag soil from initial tillage 
AgSoil_CropSequest_TillChange Carbon in cropped ag soil from tillage change 
AgSoil_CropSequest_CropChange Carbon gain from different crops 
AgSoil_PastureSequest Carbon in pasture land 
Carbon_AgFuel Carbon emissions from ag use of fossil fuel 
Carbon_Dryg Carbon emissions from grain drying 
Carbon_Fert Carbon emissions from fertilizer production 
Carbon_Pest Carbon emissions from pesticide production 
Carbon_Irrg Carbon emissions from water pumping 
Carbon_Ethl_Offset Carbon emission offset by conventional ethanol production 
Carbon_Ethl_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for conventional ethanol production 
Carbon_Ethl_Process Carbon emissions in processing of conventional ethanol production 
Carbon_CEth_Offset Carbon emission offset by cellulosic ethanol production 
Carbon_CEth_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for cellulosic ethanol production 
Carbon_CEth_Process Carbon emissions in processing of cellulosic ethanol production 
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Offset Carbon emission offset by cellulosic ethanol production from crop 
and log residues 
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for cellulosic ethanol production from crop and log residues 
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Process Carbon emissions in processing of cellulosic ethanol production from crop and log residues 
Carbon_BioElec_Offset Carbon emission offset from bioelecticity production 
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Table  4 Continued 
GHG Type Context 
Carbon_BioElec_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for bioelecticity production 
Carbon_BioElec_Process Carbon emissions in processing of for bioelecticity production 
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Offset Carbon emission offset from bioelecticity production from 
crop and log residues 
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for bioelecticity production from crop and log residues 
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Process Carbon emissions in processing of for bioelecticity production from crop and log residues 
Carbon_Biodiesel_Offset Carbon emission offset from Biodiesel production 
Carbon_Biodiesel_Haul Carbon emissions in hauling for Biodiesel production 
Carbon_Biodiesel_Process Carbon emissions in processing of Biodiesel production 
Methane_Liquidmanagement Methane from Emission savings from improved manure technologies 
Methane_EntericFerment Methane from Enteric Fermentation 
Methane_Manure Methane from Manure Management 
Methane_RiceCult Methane from Rice Cultivation 
Methane_AgResid_Burn Methane from Agricultural Residue Burning 
Methane_BioElec Methane emissions of biomass power plants below coal power plants 
Methane_Biodiesel Methane emissions from biodiesel production 
Methane_Ethl Methane emission savings from Corn ethanol processing 
Methane_CEth Methane emission savings from cellulosic ethanol processing 
NitrousOxide_Manure Livestock Manure Practices under Managed Soil Categories 
under Agriculture Soil-sequestration Management 
NitrousOxide_BioElec Nitrous oxide emissions of biomass power plants over coal power plants 
NitrousOxide_Biodiesel Nitrous Oxide emissions from biodiesel production 
NitrousOxide_Ethl Nitrous oxide emission savings from Corn ethanol processing 
NitrousOxide_CEth Nitrous oxide emissions from cellulosic ethanol processing 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Direct 
N2O from N Fertilization Application and other direct under 
Managed Soil Categories under Agriculture Soil-
sequestration Management 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Volat N2O Emissions from Indirect soils volatilization 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Leach N2O Emissions from Indirect soils Leaching Runoff 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Sludge N2O Emissions from sewage slued used as crop fertilizer 
NitrousOxide_Nfixing Emissions from N fixing crops 
NitrousOxide_CropResid Emissions from Crop residue retention 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Histosoil N2O Emissions from Temperate histosol area 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_AgResid_Burn N2O Emissions from Agricultural Residue Burning 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Direct Nitrous oxide direct emissions from Pasture 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Volat Nitrous oxide emissions from Pasture volatilization 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Leach Nitrous oxide emissions from Pasture leaching 
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          The transaction costs, reflected in the model as percentage reductions of the 
farmer-received carbon prices, were determined based on the expert opinion of members 
of the FASOMGHG development team after consulting various literatures on transaction 
costs in agricultural and forestry activities.  As shown in Table 5, values of low (5%), 
medium (15%), high (35%), and very high (40%) are assigned to different agricultural 
and forestry GHG mitigation options.  According to a major international trader of GHG 
offsets, a 15percent transaction cost would be reasonable in relationship to crop 
insurance having a 25 percent transaction cost.  If measurement and monitoring (applies 
to tillage based soil carbon) are counted, another 5 percent in transaction costs might be 
added.  Costs of some GHG strategies were lowered due to scale effects (e.g. 5 percent is 
assumed for the bioenergy option because of the large scale industrial processes 
involved).  Some transaction costs were raised due to the extreme technical challenges in 
measuring and certifying emissions (N2O from fertilization for example).   
          The 100-year global warming potentials of 1 for carbon dioxide, 21 for methane, 
and 310 for nitrous oxide were used to convert methane and nitrous oxide emissions to 
carbon dioxide equivalency.   
          The 50 categories of GHG stocks and fluxes in agriculture and forestry listed 
above can be grouped into six major categories: afforestation, forest management, soil 
carbon sequestration, biomass, agricultural CH4 & N2O, and crop management fossil 
fuel.  In the case of limited eligibility, only bioenergy, forest sequestration, manure 
handling, and fossil fuels would receive carbon payments.  The limited eligibility was set 
based on communications with government officials. 
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Table 5   Assumptions of Transaction Costs Scenario of GHG Accounts 
Low Medium High Very high 
Transaction Costs Scenario 
5% 15% 35% 40% 
Forest_SoilSequest   x  
Forest_LitterUnder  x   
Forest_ContinueTree  x   
Forest_AfforestSoilSequest   x  
Forest_AfforestLitterUnder  x   
Forest_AfforestTree  x   
Forest_USpvtProduct   x  
Forest_USpubProduct   x  
Forest_USFuelWood   x  
Forest_USFuelResidue   x  
Forest_USresidProduct   x  
Carbon_For_Fuel x    
Dev_Land_from_Ag    x 
Dev_Land_from_Forest    x 
AgSoil_CropSequest_Initial   x  
AgSoil_CropSequest_TillChange   x  
AgSoil_CropSequest_CropChange   x  
AgSoil_PastureSequest    x 
Carbon_AgFuel x    
Carbon_Dryg x    
Carbon_Fert x    
Carbon_Pest x    
Carbon_Ethl_Offset x    
Carbon_Irrg x    
Carbon_Ethl_Haul x    
Carbon_Ethl_Process x    
Carbon_CEth_Offset x    
Carbon_CEth_Haul x    
Carbon_CEth_Process x    
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Offset x    
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Haul x    
Carbon_CEth_Residue_Process x    
Carbon_BioElec_Offset x    
Carbon_BioElec_Haul x    
Carbon_BioElec_Process x    
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Table  5  Continued 
Low Medium High Very high 
Transaction Costs Scenario 
5% 15% 35% 40% 
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Offset x    
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Haul x    
Carbon_BioElec_Residue_Process x    
Carbon_Biodiesel_Offset x    
Carbon_Biodiesel_Haul x    
Carbon_Biodiesel_Process x    
Methane_Liquidmanagement  x   
Methane_EntericFerment    x 
Methane_Manure  x   
Methane_RiceCult  x   
Methane_AgResid_Burn    x 
Methane_BioElec x    
Methane_Biodiesel x    
Methane_Ethl x    
Methane_CEth x    
NitrousOxide_Manure    x 
NitrousOxide_BioElec x    
NitrousOxide_Biodiesel x    
NitrousOxide_Ethl x    
NitrousOxide_CEth x    
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Direct    x 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Volat    x 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Leach    x 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Sludge    x 
NitrousOxide_Cropland_Histosoil  x   
NitrousOxide_Cropland_AgResid_Burn    x 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Direct    x 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Volat    x 
NitrousOxide_Pasture_Leach    x 
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Table 6   Four Scenarios of Eligibility with Transaction Costs Scenarios  
Scenario Full Eligibility Limited Eligibility 
No Transaction costs X X 
With Transaction costs X X 
 
          Table 6 summarizes the four big categories of scenarios defined by different 
combinations of eligibility and transaction costs.  For each big category of scenarios, 
FASOMGHG was solved under carbon dioxide equivalent prices ranging from $0 to 
$500 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
 
Results 
          FASOMGHG produced results of the four scenarios; full eligibility without 
transaction costs, full eligibility with transaction costs, limited eligibility without 
transaction costs, and limited eligibility with transaction costs.  Table 7 shows the 
changes in the amount of carbon offsets relative to the base at carbon dioxide equivalent 
prices ranging from $0 to $500 for each of the scenarios of strategies. 
          The trends in the results of the two scenarios of full eligibility with and without 
transaction costs are similar.  As the carbon dioxide equivalent prices increased, the 
amount of reductions in emissions also increases.  When the per ton carbon dioxide 
equivalent price reaches $200, the agriculture CH4&N2O based emission reductions 
options turn positive relative to the base.  Although the sign of the crop management 
fossil fuel stays negative, the magnitude reduces as carbon equivalent prices increase,  
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Table 7   GHG Offsets Relative to Base with Transaction Costs Scenarios 
  Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Price in $/metric ton 
Full Eligibility no TC Unit Base $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 
Afforestation 1000TCE 244  1,539  7,616  19,283  24,972  27,537  29,010  
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 58,870  62,085  62,994  62,260  64,040  66,136  64,850  
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE 83,387  83,534  84,835  90,960  95,771  98,445  98,803  
Biomass 1000TCE 9,164  9,827  11,429  16,749  24,054  26,452  28,195  
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE -17,081  -16,875  -16,347  -5,727  -799  2,066  5,544  
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE -10,941  -10,759  -10,542  -9,694  -9,046  -8,482  -7,788  
Total 1000TCE 123,642 129,351 139,984 173,831 198,992 212,153 218,614 
         
Full Eligibility with TC        
Afforestation 1000TCE 244  1,540  7,616  19,283  24,974  27,537  29,010  
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 58,866  62,085  62,992  62,260  64,033  66,137  64,850  
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE 83,396  83,534  84,837  90,960  95,771  98,445  98,803  
Biomass 1000TCE 9,165  9,827  11,429  16,749  24,054  26,452  28,195  
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE -17,081  -16,876  -16,347  -5,727  -799  2,066  5,544  
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE -10,941  -10,759  -10,542  -9,694  -9,046  -8,482  -7,788  
Total 1000TCE 123,648  129,352  139,983  173,832  198,987    212,155    218,614  
         
Limited Eligibility no TC        
Afforestation 1000TCE 244  2,707  10,053  23,433  29,608  32,412  33,958  
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 58,873  59,097  58,642  60,608  64,845  65,672  65,072  
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE 83,387  83,883  86,809  92,086  94,643  96,193  95,278  
Biomass 1000TCE 9,164  10,045  12,294  17,143  24,763  28,487  36,054  
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE -17,080  -16,878  -16,465  -5,914  -911  519  2,870  
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE -10,941  -10,759  -10,542  -9,694  -9,046  -8,482  -7,788  
Total 1000TCE 123,648  128,004  140,725  177,707  203,946  214,734  224,844  
         
Limited Eligibility with TC        
Afforestation 1000TCE 244  2,707  10,053  23,434  29,608  32,412  33,958  
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 58,873  59,097  58,643  60,608  64,845  65,672  65,072  
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE 83,387  83,891  86,817  92,086  94,643  96,236  95,239  
Biomass 1000TCE 9,164  10,045  12,294  17,143  24,764  28,487  36,054  
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE -17,080  -16,878  -16,465  -5,914  -911  519  2,870  
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE -10,941  -10,759  -10,542  -9,694  -9,046  -8,482  -7,788  
Total 1000TCE 123,648  128,013  140,734  177,708  203,947  214,777    224,804  
TCE is Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. 
 
 35 
Table 8   Results of Differences at Scenarios of Eligibilities with Same Condition of  
               Transaction Costs Scenarios 
 
 Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Price in $/metric ton 
Difference between Full Eligibility no TC 
and Limited Eligibility no TC Unit $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 
Afforestation 1000TCE -1,168 -2,437 -4,150 -4,636 -4,875 -4,948 
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 2,988 4,352 1,652 -805 464 -222 
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE -349 -1,974 -1,125 1,128 2,252 3,525 
Biomass 1000TCE -218 -865 -394 -709 -2,036 -7,859 
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE 2 117 187 111 1,546 2,674 
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE 91 66 -45 -44 68 599 
Total 1000TCE 1,347 -741 -3,876 -4,954 -2,581 -6,230 
        
Difference between Full Eligibility with TC 
and Limited Eligibility with TC       
Afforestation 1000TCE -1,168 -2,438 -4,151 -4,634 -4,875 -4,948 
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE 2,988 4,349 1,652 -812 464 -222 
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE -357 -1,980 -1,126 1,128 2,209 3,565 
Biomass 1000TCE -218 -865 -393 -710 -2,035 -7,858 
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE 2 117 187 112 1,546 2,674 
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE 91 66 -45 -44 68 599 
Total 1000TCE 1,339 -751 -3,876 -4,960 -2,622 -6,190 
TCE is Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. 
A positive value means that the amount of emission reductions is greater under full eligibility 
than under limited eligibility. 
A negative value means that the amount of emission reductions is greater under limited 
eligibility than under full eligibility. 
           
implying decreasing GHG emissions.  The largest reduction of emissions occurs for soil 
carbon sequestration reaching 98 MMT under the scenario of full eligibility with 
transaction costs and with a carbon dioxide equivalent price of $500. 
          As shown in Table 7, under the scenarios of limited eligibility without transaction 
costs, most of the strategies show a reduction in net emissions as the carbon dioxide 
equivalent prices increase except for crop management fossil fuel.  Similar results are 
found for the scenarios of limited eligibility without transaction costs.  Also, note that 
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significant increase in GHG emission reductions occur for the agricultural CH4& N2O 
and crop management fossil fuel strategies when carbon dioxide equivalent prices very 
high.  
          Table 8 presents the differences between full eligibility and limited eligibility 
scenarios both with and without transaction costs scenarios.  Regardless of the presence 
of transaction costs, the implementation of afforestation and biomass strategies result in 
greater reductions in GHG emissions under scenarios of limited eligibility than under 
full eligibility.  On the other hand, the strategies of agriculture CH4 & N2O appears to 
bring about more reductions in GHG emissions under full eligibility than under limited 
eligibility.  The total difference between full and limited eligibility can be to over 6 
MMT at $500 carbon dioxide equivalent price. 
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Figure 2   Difference between Full Eligibility without Transaction Costs and Limited 
                 Eligibility without Transaction Costs  
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Figure 3   Difference between Full Eligibility with Transaction Costs and Limited 
                 Eligibility with Transaction Costs 
          Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows the response of difference GHG strategies under both 
eligibilities without transaction costs and with transaction costs over the various carbon 
dioxide equivalent price levels.  Also, the strategy of forest management shows an 
advantage of transaction costs under full eligibility when carbon dioxide equivalent 
prices are lower. 
          Table 9 shows the differences between scenarios of eligibilities with and without 
transaction costs.  For most of the strategies, the effect of transactions costs inclusion 
appears to be small.  In the scenario of full eligibility, all mitigation options are impacted 
by transactions costs when the carbon dioxide equivalent prices are between $50 and 
$200.  The strategy of the afforestation has the largest emission reductions with a carbon 
dioxide equivalent price of $100 under full eligibility.  When the carbon dioxide 
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equivalent price was $10, the effect of transactions costs was largest in full eligibility.  
When the carbon dioxide equivalent price was $100, the total amount of reductions of 
the full eligibility without transactions costs was larger than the full eligibility with 
transactions costs.  For total reductions of emissions, when the carbon dioxide equivalent 
prices were $10, $50, $200, and $500, the supply of emission reductions was reduced 
with transaction costs.  Graphically depicted, the emission reductions supply curve shifts 
to the left with a reduced quantity at each price level. 
  
Table 9   Results of Differences at Scenarios of Eligibilities with Transaction Costs 
              Scenarios 
  Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Price in $/metric ton 
Difference Full Eligibility no TC 
between Full Eligibility with TC Unit $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 
Afforestation 1000TCE -0.67 0.15 0.00 -1.92 -0.45 0.04 
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE -0.62 2.43 -0.05 6.39 -0.23 0.00 
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE -0.49 -1.58 -0.03 0.30 -0.22 -0.07 
Biomass 1000TCE -0.06 -0.07 -0.53 0.37 -0.32 -0.31 
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE 0.09 0.15 -0.06 -0.32 -0.18 0.04 
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE 0.13 0.12 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 
Total 1000TCE -1.61 1.20 -0.68 4.90 -1.46 -0.31 
        
Difference Limited Eligibility no TC 
between Limited Eligibility with TC       
Afforestation 1000TCE -0.71 -0.42 -1.29 0.00 0.00 -0.25 
Forest Mgt. 1000TCE -0.36 -0.63 -0.25 -0.02 0.01 0.15 
Soil C Seq. 1000TCE -8.28 -7.80 -0.49 0.02 -42.58 39.26 
Biomass 1000TCE -0.18 0.06 0.46 -0.67 0.00 0.23 
Ag CH4&N2O 1000TCE -0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Crop Mgt. Foss. Fuel 1000TCE -0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Total 1000TCE -9.68 -8.87 -1.38 -0.65 -42.55 39.41 
TCE is Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. 
A positive value means that the amount of emission reductions is greater under scenarios without 
transaction costs than with transaction costs. 
A negative means that the amount of emission reductions is greater under scenarios with 
transaction costs than without transaction costs. 
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          Broadly speaking, under limited eligibility, the effect of transactions costs is larger 
than under full eligibility.  Except for the carbon dioxide equivalent price of $500, the 
inclusion of transaction costs increase the total amount of GHG offsets produced.  Note 
that when the carbon dioxide equivalent price is $200, the inclusion of transaction costs 
encourages the soil sequestration based GHG mitigation activities, however, when the 
carbon dioxide equivalent price is $500, the inclusion of transaction costs turns out to an 
impeding factor these activities. 
          Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the differences between scenarios with and without 
transaction costs, for both full and limited eligibility.  In the full eligibility case, the 
strategy of the forest management without transactions costs has largest emission 
reductions with a carbon dioxide equivalent price of $100 as do afforestation with  
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Figure 4   Difference between Full Eligibility without Transaction Costs and  
                 Full Eligibility with Transaction Costs 
 40 
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
$0 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500
Afforestation
Forest Management
Soil Carbon Sequestration
Biomass
Ag CH4&N2O
Crop Management Fossil Fuel
Carbon Value in Dollars per TCE
Emission Reduction in Metric Ton of Carbon Equivalents
 
Figure 5   Difference between Limited Eligibility without Transaction Costs and  
                 Limited Eligibility with Transaction Costs 
 
transactions costs.  In the limited eligibility scenarios, the strategy of the soil carbon 
sequestration with a carbon dioxide equivalent price of $200 increase because of the 
effect of transactions costs.  When the carbon dioxide equivalent price is $500, the 
eligibility without transactions costs has much more emission reductions than the 
eligibility without transactions costs. 
          The results demonstrate that how GHG mitigation strategies are employed depend 
upon the carbon dioxide equivalent prices.  Also, the reduction of emissions occurred 
more as transaction costs were applied for both full eligibility and limited eligibility.  At 
$100 and $20, afforestation in full eligibility and soil carbon sequestration in limited 
eligibility appear highly responsive to transaction costs.  
 
 41 
Conclusion 
          The implications of transactions costs in determining optimal agricultural and 
forestry based GHG mitigation strategies for providing GHG offsets was examined.  The 
inclusion of transactions costs in analysis reduces the role of agriculture and forestry 
GHG mitigation strategies as the effective price received by GHG offset producers is 
lowered.  Also the degree to which the spectrum of GHG mitigation options is limited 
has implications.  Under limited eligibility there are larger GHG emission reductions for 
afforestation than under full eligibility when transactions costs are included.  In both 
cases, the forest management portfolio share in limited eligibility has more reductions 
than other mitigation strategies.  The effect of including transactions costs is not large 
for overall mitigation but fairly significant for the portfolio composition of GHG 
mitigation option under scenarios of full eligibility with the carbon dioxide equivalent 
price of $100 when transaction costs are not included.  The effect of transaction costs 
also appears to be large for the portfolio share of the afforestation and the soil carbon 
sequestration strategies.  In general, the inclusion of transaction costs shifts the supply 
curve of GHG emission reductions to the left.  Theses findings may inform policymakers 
about how transaction costs influence GHG offsets provided by the agriculture and 
forestry sector, thus, helping them make better decisions regarding the treatment of GHG 
mitigation options portfolio in national climate policy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION OF STORAGE COST  
IN BIOENERGY PRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
          Biomass energy can be produced from the agricultural or forest production.  
Assessment of energy crops in the U.S. agricultural sector shows that although biomass 
based electricity is expensive, it has considerable potential to offset carbon emissions 
(McCarl et al., 2001).   
          Even though a biomass fired power plant emits CO2 into the atmosphere, plant 
growth absorbs it through the photosynthesis process.  Using agricultural products to 
generate energy in a power plant generally involves recycling of CO2 as opposed to 
traditional fossil fuels that only emit CO2 (McCarl, 1998).  Moreover, the emissions 
from combustion and extraction of an equivalent amount of fossil fuels are saved with 
the emissions from biomass amounting to approximately 95 percent CO2 emitted when 
burning the biomass (Kline et al., 1998). 
          Currently, biomass conversion into forms of energy is receiving largely attention 
because of environmental, energy supply and agricultural concerns although it is an old 
idea (McCarl and Schneider, 2001).  Specifically, using biomass for fuels, power, and 
products can make important contributions to U.S. energy security, agricultural 
economy, and environmental quality (Schneider and McCarl, 2005).  
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         Biomass has to be stored from the time of harvest to its use by a power plant or 
biorefinery.  Thus, biomass must be accumulated during harvest periods so that 
feedstocks are available for year-round bioenergy production.  A biomass storage system 
should be designed to minimize dry matter loss, and protect and enhance, when possible, 
the quality of biomass until it is utilized (Turhollow et al., 2009). 
          Biomass from dry matter losses occur in various ways.  Leaves and other parts of 
the plants are lost and broken in the wind or mixed with soil during collection processes.  
Some of the losses occur during storage due to fermentation and breakdown of plant 
carbohydrates.  Weather is another factor that creates biomass losses, primarily by 
precipitation and/or water absorption from the ground.  Sokhansanj et al. (2006) 
developed a logistics model for estimating storage dry matter losses based on a seasonal 
bioenergy feedstocks.  They found that the dry matter loss is significantly affected by the 
moisture content of stalks with an inverted U-shape relationship.  Richardson et al 
(2002) found that an increase in dry matter losses reduces overall energy content and 
increases the ash content of the biomass.   
          Richey et al. (1982) reported that dry matter losses in round bales of corn stover 
stored outdoors ranged from 10 to 23 percent of total biomass depending on initial stover 
moisture.  Shinners et al. (2007) evaluated the costs of ensiling corn stover.  Turhollow 
and Sokhansanj (2007) performed an extensive economic analysis of storing high 
moisture corn stover in large piles similar to a bagasse storage method used by the 
pulping industry. 
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          The total cost of biomass storage can be calculated by summing the cost generated 
from storage site or materials and the cost of dry matter losses during storage (Turhollow 
et al., 2009) 
          Table 10 gives the estimated dry matter loss for stored round bales of hay.  The 
enclosed shed and plastic wrap on ground storage methods have the smallest amount of 
dry matter losses.  The uncovered on gravel pad method has a significant amount of the 
dry matter loss ranging from 13 ~ 17 percent.  It is worth noting that storage losses in 
rectangular bales could vary significantly from these estimates depending on ambient 
weather conditions.  Moreover, dry matter losses from other biomass crops such as corn 
stover and switchgrass may differ from the above findings. 
          Shinners et al. (2007) founded that, for the inside storage, the value of the dry 
matter loss of large round bales is generally greater than that of large square bales.  The 
value of dry matter losses from the outside storage on the ground for different types of 
bale tying (sisal twine, plastic twine, and net wrap) is generally greater than that from 
outside storage on pallets.  On average, the percentage of the dry matter losses from the 
 
Table 10   Estimated Dry Matter Loss in Round Bales of Hay from Various  
                 Storage Methods 
Storage Method Estimated Annual Dry Matter Loss, % 
Enclosed shed 2~5 
Open-sided pole structure 3~10 
Reusable tarp on gravel pad 5~10 
Plastic wrap on ground 4~7 
Uncovered on gravel pad 13~17 
Sources: Collins et al. (1997), Huhnke (2006) 
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Table 11   Percentage of Dry Matter Loss in Storage Characteristics of Dry Corn  
                 Stover Bale 
Dry Matter Loss (% of total) 
Storage Location Wrap and/or Bale Type 2002 2003 Average 
Large round 4.9 2.2 3.6 
Inside 
Large square 4.8 1.1 3.0 
Inside Total Average  3.3 
Sisal twine 29.1 38.5 33.8 
Plastic twine 14.3 19.0 16.7 Outside on ground 
Net wrap 10.7 14.2 12.5 
Sisal twine 17.7 36.1 26.9 
Plastic twine 11.4 11.0 11.2 Outside on pallets 
Net wrap 7.0 8.2 7.6 
Outside Total Average  18.1 
Source: Shinners et al. (2007) 
 
inside storage (3.3%) is less than that from the outside storage (18.1%) based on the data 
in Table 11. 
 
Table 12   Average Percentages of Reported Dry Matter Losses from Inside and Outside  
                 Storage 
Dry Matter Losses (% of total biomass)  
Studies 
Inside storage Outside storage 
Turhollow et al. (2009) 2.0 15.5 
Shinners et al. (2007) 3.3 18.1 
Collins et al. (1997),  
Huhnke (2006) 3.5 8.6 
Average 2.9 14.1 
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          A comparison of the average dry matter losses from the above mentioned studied 
for both inside and outside storage is in Table 12.  The average percentage of the dry 
matter losses across all studies is 2.9 and 14.1 percent for inside and outside storage, 
respectively.  
          Turhollow et al. (2009) analyzed the cost of storage options for swicthgrass bales.  
They assumed the storage system was a barn built on agricultural land that would hold 
110 bales and would occupy 2.47 acres.  In forming their estimates, they determined 
land cost, annualized construction cost, rent, insurance and taxes.  The components of 
the total cost estimates are shown in Table 13.  Their annual cost of inside storage was 
$2,464 while the cost of outside storage was $1,020.  The primary reason inside storage 
costs are higher than those of outside storage is the barn’s construction cost which was 
annualized over the life of the structure.  
          The costs of repair, taxes, and insurance from Gay and Grisso (2002) were 0.7 
percent, 1.0 percent, and 0.3 percent of the initial investment, respectively.  Using these 
costs, 2 percent of the initial investment is $443 and $72 for inside and outside storage, 
respectively, for repair taxes and insurance costs. 
          The annual cost is equal to $22.4/dry ton ($2,464/110 dry ton) and $9.3/dry ton 
($1,020/110 dry ton) for inside and outside storage, respectively.  By incorporating the 
dry matter loss (2.9 percent for inside and 14.1 percent for outside) into annual cost, the 
adjusted annual storage cost is $23.1 and 10.8 per dry ton for inside and outside storage, 
respectively, as show in Table 14. 
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Table 13   Estimated Annual Cost of a Biomass Storage System*  
 Inside Outside 
Land1) $85/ac ($210/ha) $85/ac ($210/ha) 
Tarp Gravel Pad 
Construction Cost $22,1552) 
$1,2983) $2,3084) 
Useful Life 20 yr 5 yr 10 yr 
Interest Rate5) 0.06 
Annualized construction 
cost of Building $1,936
6)
 $3087) $3148) 
Insurance, taxes  
& Repair $443
9)
 $7210) 
Annual Cost $2,46411) $1,02012) 
* 110 dry ton capacity. 
1) US average annual cash rent for cropland with state average in 2007 assuming total land 
area assigned to storage was 0.99 aces are used. 
2) The building cost was $99.35/m2 and the size of the building was determined using the same 
procedure as the gravel pad as 223.4m2 ($99.35/m2 ×223.4m2 = $22,155). 
3) The tarp area required was 446m2 and the estimated cost of a hay tarp was $2.37/m2.  
Assuming a labor rate is $10/h, $0.54/m2 of tarp area (($2.37/m2 + $0.54/m2) × 446m2 = 
$1,298).   
4) The gravel pad was sized for all sides of the stack for a total area of 223 m2 and cost of 
constructing gravel pad is $10.33/m2 ($10.33/m2×223 m2 = $2,308). 
5) Assumed an interest rate of 6%. 
6) C0_inside = ($22,155)(0.06/(1-(1+0.06)-20)) = $1,936 
7) C0_tarp = ($1,298)(0.06/(1-(1+0.06)-5)) = $308 
8) C0_gravel = ($2,308)(0.06/(1-(1+0.06)-10)) = $314 
9) The annual costs of repair and insurance were $443 (2% of the $22,155 initial investment). 
10) The annual costs of repair and insurance were $72 (2% of the ($1,298 + $2,308) initial 
investment). 
11) The total annual cost of storing biomass indoors included the building ($1,936), land 
($85), and insurance and repair ($443) is $2,464. 
12) The total annual cost of storing biomass on a gravel pad and covered with a tarp which 
included the tarp ($308), gravel pad ($314), land ($85), labor to place and remove the tarp 
each year is $241 ($0.54/ m2 × 446 m2), and insurance and repair ($72) is $1,020. 
Source: Turhollow et al. (2009) 
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Table 14   Adjusted Annual Costs of Two Options of Biomass Storage 
 Inside Outside 
Average of dry matter loss 2.9% 14.1% 
Annual cost $22.4/dry ton $9.3/dry ton 
Adjusted annual cost $23.1/dry ton $10.8/dry ton 
 
          Another factor that affects storage costs is that more than one set of bales can be 
stored per year.  For example, if bales are stored for six months and utilized, then a new 
group of bales can be stored for the last six months of the same year.  In this case, the 
storage cost per ton should be reduced by half for that year.  Also, one producer may 
take their biomass bales immediately after harvest to the bioenergy plant, while another 
producer may have to keep their bales in storage for future delivery to the bioenergy 
plant.  Three potential schemes for storage premiums exist.  First, the producer could be 
paid a set per ton per month premium for each month (from one to twelve) that the bales 
are kept in his possession.  Second, the producer could agree to a maximum of six 
months of storage and be paid for each month beyond six that he still has the bales.  
Finally, the producer could be paid a flat per ton premium only if they keep the bales for 
six months or more.  This would be payment for the opportunity cost of the land on 
which the bales are stored.  If bales are kept on the edge of the field for more than six 
months, that land will not be available for planting a crop or producing more switchgrass 
in the year after harvest. 
          Although biomass storage costs are parts of the cost of a GHG offset trading 
system, researchers have often ignored these costs.  The storage cost occurs between 
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harvest at the farm and use by the bioenergy plant and could be classified as a 
transaction cost.  The objective of this chapter is to examine the emission reductions 
impact of storage costs adjusted for the dry matter losses for both inside and outside 
storage on the portfolio of biomass commodity options in an emission reductions 
program.  
 
Methodology and Assumptions 
          FASOMGHG was used to estimate the GHG mitigation potential for U.S. 
agricultural and forest sector for this storage cost analysis.  The list of all biomass 
commodities in FASOMGHG that could be stored is in Table 15.   
          Table 16 contains the data for determining the storage costs of FASOMGHG 
biomass commodities.  This data includes the number of months of peak storage, the 
number of months an average ton is stored, the amortized cost of building and keeping 
storage for one unit of feedstock, the cost of moving one unit of feedstock in and out of 
storage, and the cost of maintaining one unit of the feedstock for one month.  Also, it is 
assumed that the annual cost of the biomass storage system is fixed for both indoor and 
outdoor storage costs because the costs have already been paid.  For this study, dry 
matter losses were assumed for both indoor and outdoor storage to be 2.9 and 14.1 
percent, respectively, following the discussion above. 
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Table 15   FASOMGHG Biomass Commodities That Could Be Stored 
Biomass Commodities Context 
cornres Corn crop residues in tons   
wheatres Wheat crop residues in tons 
sorghumres Sorghum crop residues in tons 
barleyres Barley crop residues in tons 
oatsres Oat crop residues in tons 
riceres Rice crop residues in tons 
sspulp Sweet Sorghum Pulp in US tons 
switchgrass SwitchGrass in US tons 
willow Willow in US tons 
hybrdpoplar Hybrid Poplar in US tons 
energysorghum Energy Sorghum for biofuels 
miscanthus Miscanthus in US tons   
bagasse Sugarcane bagasse in tons 
biomanure Manure for use in bioprocesses in tons 
beefbiomanure Manure for use in bioprocesses in tons 
dairybiomanure Manure for use in bioprocesses in tons 
Lignin Lignin produced from cellulosic non-wood ethanol process in tons 
LigninHardwood Lignin produced from cellulosic hardwood ethanol process in tons 
LigninSoftwood Lignin produced from cellulosic softwood ethanol process in tons   
SoftwoodRes Soft wood logging residues in tons 
HardwoodRes Hard wood logging residues in tons 
SoftwoodPulp Soft wood pulp in tons 
HardwoodPulp Hard wood pulp in tons 
SoftMillRes Soft wood milling residues in tons 
HardMillRes Hard wood milling residues in tons 
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Table 16   FASOMGHG Biomass Commodities Storage Cost Data 
Biomass Commodities  Peak 
months1) 
Avg 
months2) 
Fixedcost 
peak3) 
Pertonin 
andout4) 
Costper 
month5) 
cornres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
wheatres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
sorghumres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
barleyres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
oatsres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
riceres 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
sspulp 5 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
switchgrass 9 3.75 7.15 4.59 2.72 
willow 4 0.83 7.15 4.59 2.72 
hybrdpoplar 4 0.83 7.15 4.59 2.72 
energysorghum 6 1.75 7.15 4.59 2.72 
miscanthus 6 1.75 7.15 4.59 2.72 
bagasse 10 4.58 7.15 4.59 2.72 
biomanure 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
beefbiomanure 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
dairybiomanure 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
Lignin 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
LigninHardwood 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
LigninSoftwood 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
SoftwoodRes 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
HardwoodRes 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
SoftwoodPulp 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
HardwoodPulp 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
SoftMillRes 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
HardMillRes 0 0 7.15 4.59 2.72 
Note: See Table 15 for definitions.  
1) Number of months of supply stored at peak based on harvest window of crop 
 2) Number of months average ton is stored calculated assuming a uniform drawdown of storage 
 3) Amortized cost of building and keeping storage for one unit of feedstock and assumed to be $7.15 
based on preliminary results from Searcy. 
 4) Amortized cost of moving 1unit of feedstock in and out of storage and assumed $4.59 based on Rose. 
 5) Cost of maintaining one unit of the feedstock for one month and assumed $2.72 based on opportunity 
cost of money. 
 6) Crop residues assume 2 month harvest window so must store 10 months        
 7) Crop residues assume annual average is 10/12+9/12+8/12+...+1/12                
 8) Switchgrass assume 3 month harvest window so must store 9 months     
 9) Switchgrass assume annual average is 9/12+8/12+...+1/12                 
 10) Wood items assume 12 month harvest window so must store 0 months     
 11) Energy sorghum assume 6 month harvest window so must store 6 months  
 12) Energy sorghum assume annual average is 6/12+5/12+...+1/12              
 13) Miscanthus assume 6 month harvest window so must store 6 months      
 14) Miscanthus assume annual average is 6/12+5/12+...+1/12        
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Results 
          FASOMGHG was used to see how the storage cost including dry matter losses 
affects the GHG mitigation portfolio.   
Table 17 shows the amount of estimated emission reductions and welfare 
changes from dry matter loss of biomass arising due to both indoor and outdoor storage 
between a case with and without the dry matter loss of biomass under different carbon 
dioxide equivalent prices.  It was found that the total amount of emission reductions 
from both indoor and outdoor storage was positively correlated to the carbon dioxide 
equivalent price.  In the case of biomass, at $500 of carbon dioxide equivalent price, the 
amount of emission reductions from both storage methods reaches about 28 MMT.  
  The difference between the amount of emission reductions from indoor and 
outdoor storage under different carbon dioxide equivalent prices is also shown in Table 
17.  A negative (positive) sign in this table means that the amount of emission reductions 
from biomass indoor storage is smaller (larger) than that from outdoor storage.  The 
difference between these two storage methods is very small for all levels of carbon 
prices.  When carbon dioxide equivalent price are in the range from $20 to $200, the 
amount of emission reductions in biomass from outdoor storage exceed those from 
indoor storage implying the outdoor storage method is more competitive in emission 
reductions than indoor storage over that carbon price range.  When the price is very large 
the outdoor storage included emission reductions are smaller than that from indoor 
storage indicating that indoor storage may be more effective carbon dioxide equivalent.  
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The emission reductions of biomass with dry matter loss both indoor and outdoor reach a 
maximum of about 75 MMT.   
          Table 17 contains the value of the slope of the “Difference between Indoor and 
Outdoor” line of Figure 6.  The slope has a negative value from $10 ~ $50 carbon price, 
while it is positive after the $50 carbon price.  The amount of emission reductions for 
indoor storage relative to outdoor storage decreases 0.1171 metric tons and 0.0048 
metric tons as the carbon dioxide equivalent price increases by a dollar in the range of 
carbon dioxide equivalent price of $10 ~ $20 and $20 ~ $50, respectively.  On the other 
hand, if the carbon dioxide equivalent price is above $50 dollar per metric ton, the 
amount of emission reductions for indoor storage relative to outdoor storage will 
increase as the price of carbon dioxide equivalent price increases with the amount of the 
increase equal to 0.0044, 0.0087, and 0.0004 metric tons in the range of carbon dioxide 
equivalent price of $50 ~ $100, $100 ~ $200, and $200 ~ $500, respectively.  This is 
demonstrated in Figure 6. 
          The overall societal welfare results from storage loss consideration are also shown 
in Table 17.  The data in the table are calculated as the change from a no storage case or 
loss case to one where storage cost and either indoor and outdoor dry matter losses are 
included for a given carbon dioxide equivalent price.  These results show that total 
societal welfare is raised by considering dry matter loss with the loss positively 
correlated to the carbon dioxide equivalent price.  At a $500 carbon dioxide equivalent 
price, the total societal welfare loss reaches a maximum of about $7,100 billion.  When 
the carbon dioxide equivalent prices were $10 and $100, the welfare of indoor storage  
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Table 17   Estimated Biomass Emission Reductions and Welfare from Dry Matter Loss  
                 for Indoor and for Outdoor Storage Methods under Different Carbon Dioxide  
                 Equivalent Prices 
Reduction of Emissions Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Price in $/metric ton 
Biomass (1000TCE) $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 
DML for Indoor Storage      9,844    11,437 16,824   24,101    26,444    28,205  
DML for Outdoor Storage      9,843    11,437    16,824    24,102    26,444    28,205  
Without DML      9,827    11,429    16,749    24,054    26,452    28,195  
       
Difference between       
Indoor and Outdoor1) 
-0.58 0.59 0.73 0.52 0.07 -0.03 
Indoor and without DML2) 
-16.10 -8.32 -74.91 -46.98 7.17 -9.99 
Outdoor and without DML2) 
-15.52 -8.91 -75.64 -47.49 7.09 -9.95 
 
      
Slope of difference between 
indoor and outdoor - -0.1171 -0.0048 0.0044 0.0087 0.0004 
       
Welfare (billion dollar)       
Indoor 5,857 5,884 5,852 6,038 6,271 7,077 
Outdoor 5,698 5,885 5,900 5,891 6,271 7,077 
Difference between Indoor 
and Outdoor3) -159.66 0.18 47.38 -146.87 0.03 0.07 
TCE is Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. 
1) A positive (negative) value means that the reductions of emissions of indoor storage are 
greater (smaller) than the reductions of emissions of outdoor storage. 
2) A positive (negative) value means that the reductions of emissions without dry matter loss 
storage are greater (smaller) than the reductions of emissions of indoor or outdoor storage. 
3) A positive (negative) value means that the welfare with outdoor with dry matter loss storage 
are greater (smaller) than the welfare with indoor with dry matter loss storage. 
 
with dry matter loss was greater than outdoor storage with dry matter loss.  The welfare 
of outdoor storage was greater than the welfare of indoor storage when the carbon 
dioxide equivalent price $50.  At the carbon dioxide equivalent prices $20, $200, and 
$500, the welfare both indoor and outdoor were similar.  At a $10 price, the amount of 
the emission reductions and the welfare of the indoor storage with dry matter loss were 
greater than the amount of the emission reductions and welfare of the outdoor storage  
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Figure 6   Results of Differences at Storage Costs Scenario between Indoor and  
                Outdoor in Biomass 
 
with dry matter loss so indoor storage would be preferred.  However, carbon dioxide 
equivalent price at a price of $50, $200, and $500, the amount of emission reduction and 
the welfare loss with outdoor storage is greater than that with indoor storage.  
          Table 18 shows the amount of estimated emission reductions from the total of all 
GHG mitigation strategies by dry matter loss both indoor and outdoor storage and from 
total GHG account under different carbon dioxide equivalent prices. 
          These results show that the total amount of emission reduction from all mitigation 
strategies with dry matter loss for indoor and outdoor storage and without dry matter loss 
was positively correlated to the carbon dioxide equivalent price.  In table 18 for the 
difference between indoor and outdoor storage both with and without dry matter loss, the 
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Table 18   Estimated Total Emission Reductions from Dry Matter Loss for Indoor and  
                 for Outdoor Storage Methods under Different Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
                 Prices in 1000 Metric tones Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
Reduction of Emissions Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Price in $/metric ton 
Total $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 
Total DML for Indoor 
 129,457  139,911  174,022  199,098  212,196  218,650  
Total DML for Outdoor 
 129,458  139,906  174,022  199,098  212,196  218,650  
Total without DML 
 129,351  139,984  173,831  198,992  212,153  218,614  
       
Difference between       
Indoor and Outdoor1) 1.00 -4.80 0.45 -0.15 0.25 0.08 
Indoor and Total w/o DML2) 
-106.00 73.49 -190.96 -106.05 -42.55 -35.51 
Outdoor and Total w/o DML2) 
-107.00 78.29 -191.41 -105.91 -42.80 -35.59 
TCE is Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. 
1) A positive (negative) value means that the reductions of emissions of indoor storage are 
greater (smaller) than the reductions of emissions of outdoor storage. 
2) A positive (negative) value means that the reductions of emissions indoor or outdoor storage 
system are greater (smaller) than the reductions of emissions of total without dry matter loss.  
 
negative (positive) sign means that the amount of emission reductions from all 
mitigation strategies without dry matter loss is smaller (larger) than that from both 
indoor and outdoor storage.  If the carbon dioxide equivalent price is between $20 and 
$100, the emission reductions of outdoor storage are larger than indoor storage.  In the 
case of the difference between indoor or outdoor storage and no dry matter loss, the 
amount of emission reductions from indoor or outdoor storage are larger than the amount 
without dry matter loss except for carbon dioxide equivalent price $20.  This implies that 
the indoor or outdoor storage with dry matter loss produces more emission reductions 
than without dry matter loss at that carbon dioxide equivalent price.  At a $50 carbon 
dioxide equivalent price, the difference in emission reductions between indoor or 
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outdoor storage with dry matter loss and without dry matter loss reaches about 191 
MMT. 
 
Conclusion 
          In this chapter, the implications of storage cost including dry matter loss were 
explored for agricultural and forestry based GHG mitigation alternatives.  By reviewing 
previous studies, it was found that the average dry matter losses for indoor and outdoor 
storage can be estimated at 2.9 and 14.1 percent of total biomass, respectively.  
Incorporating the dry matter loss in the storage cost increases the total storage cost.  In 
general, the study found that the total amount of emission reductions from both indoor 
and outdoor storage is positively correlated to the carbon dioxide equivalent price.  
Although the percentage of dry matter losses from the indoor storage is generally lower 
than that from the outdoor storage, the amount of the emission reductions from both 
indoor and outdoor storage methods varies depending on the level of carbon dioxide 
equivalent price.  The outdoor storage method is more competitive than the indoor 
storage method, if the carbon dioxide equivalent price ranges from $20 ~ $200.  
Otherwise, the indoor storage method is more advantageous than the outdoor storage 
method.  The amount of emission reductions of biomass from dry matter loss of indoor 
or outdoor storage is larger than the amount of emission reductions without dry matter 
loss under all carbon dioxide equivalent prices except for $200.  Considering the slope of 
the difference between the amount of the emission reductions from indoor and outdoor 
storage, the competiveness of the indoor storage method tends to increase as carbon 
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dioxide equivalent price increases.  Although the costs of the indoor storage are higher 
than the outdoor storage, incorporating the dry matter loss as a storage cost increases the 
competiveness of indoor storage (lower dry matter loss) versus the outdoor storage 
(higher dry matter loss) as the carbon dioxide equivalent price increases.  For the total 
emission reductions from all mitigation strategies from dry matter loss, except for $50, 
the amount of emission reductions of indoor or outdoor storage is larger than total 
emission reductions without dry matter loss.  If policy makers are making decisions only 
on a biomass mitigation strategy, they should consider how much the carbon dioxide 
equivalent price affects emission reductions related to storage systems.  Also, by 
considering the total emission reductions from all strategies when storage systems are 
used, they could identify the carbon dioxide equivalent price that reduces emissions.  
These findings could provide valuable information for policy makers regarding the 
reduction of GHG using biomass. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
          Transaction costs are typically ignored when assessing the greenhouse gas 
marginal abatement curve as well as the associated role of alternative mitigation 
strategies.  These costs are difficult to estimate and have not been a major focus of many 
studies.  In the last ten years, some papers have done some estimates of transaction costs 
on a project-basis.  These papers show significant levels of costs.  However, there are no 
papers that analyze the impact of transaction costs directly on the sectoral wide marginal 
abatement curve or the choice of greenhouse gas mitigation strategies.  
          This dissertation examines how transaction costs including storage costs affect 
agriculture and forestry levels of greenhouse gas mitigation.  In this analysis, the 
following are examined; 1) the general economics of how marginal abatement curves are 
impacted by transactions costs plus the estimates of these costs by research teams; 2) the 
empirical their role that transactions costs play in estimates of the marginal abatement 
curve for agricultural and forestry based GHG emission offsets plus the role of 
alternative strategies; 3) the reasons for including storage costs; and 4) their impacts of 
including storage costs on estimates of the marginal abatement curve for agricultural and 
forestry based GHG emission offsets. 
          The transaction costs reported by many researchers were reviewed and the cost 
components identified, that is, assembly costs, measurement and monitoring, 
certification, enforcement, additional adoption cost incentive estimates, and procedures 
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for and cost of risk/liability for adverse outcomes.  By graphical analysis, when 
transaction costs are considered in a GHG offset trading market, the emission reductions 
supply curve will be shifted to the left.  The transaction costs effectively lower carbon 
dioxide equivalent prices to the GHG offset supplier which decreases the quantity of 
GHG offsets supplied. 
The effect of differential transactions costs across alternative strategies was also 
examined with the finding that the relative shares of abatement are likely to shift with 
increases in those with the least transactions cost and decreases in those with the highest. 
          The effect of transaction costs on the optimal level and portfolio composition of 
GHG emission reductions by agriculture and forestry was then examined.  Four 
scenarios were analyzed:   
• full eligibility of all GHG mitigation strategies without transaction costs,  
• full eligibility with transaction costs,  
• limited eligibility of GHG mitigation strategies without transaction costs, and  
• limited eligibility with transaction costs.   
          The eligibility scenarios cover the extent to which GHG offset possibilities are 
eligible for payment.  The limited eligibility scenarios only allow fossil fuel, bioenergy, 
sequestration, and manure emissions capture as GHG offset alternatives that receive 
carbon dioxide equivalent prices.   
Each of these scenarios was run under a range of carbon dioxide equivalent 
prices.  The transaction costs expressed as percentages of the carbon dioxide equivalent 
price were developed based on the expert opinion of members of the FASOMGHG 
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team.  The percentage of transaction costs ranged across four cases; low (5%), medium 
(15%), high (35%), and very high (40%).  
           The emission reductions are not greatly affected by transactions costs varying at 
most by 6 MMT.  The limited eligibility versus full eligibility has large implications 
with the limited emissions reducing the volume of offsets generated.  In particular, the 
emission reductions from afforestation are substantially smaller because the other gains 
from fertilizer reductions etc are not credited under limited eligibility.   
          There are relatively large differences in the optimal portfolio of GHG mitigation 
alternatives when transaction costs are considered.  The results indicate that transaction 
costs are an important factor in determining the emission reductions strategies to pursue.  
The portfolio of mitigation alternatives is different for each carbon dioxide equivalent 
price for both eligibility scenarios.  Finally, policymakers should be aware of which 
GHG mitigation alternatives under the various scenarios are most significantly affected 
by transactions costs, so that, they can use this information to make decisions about 
GHG mitigation portfolios for national climate policy legislation and the strategies found 
to be most affected here are afforestation, soil carbon sequestration, forest management, 
and biomass with the first two shrinking and the latter growing. 
          Storage costs are another commonly omitted factor when considering bioenergy 
related GHG mitigation strategies.  The use of crop residues or energy crops as 
bioenergy feedstocks is likely to require substantial storage activities due to seasonality 
of supply and the bulkiness of commodities.  In recent years, some studies have 
examined storage losses and costs.   
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          In this study, the effect of storage costs was examined with estimates developed 
based on the literature.  In this case were calculated including an adjustment for dry 
matter losses.  The average dry matter loss for indoor and outdoor storage was estimated 
to be 2.9 and 14.1 percent of total biomass, respectively.  The total storage cost amounts 
to $23.1/dry ton/year and $10.8/dry ton/year for inside and outside storage, respectively 
including dry matter loss.  
The FASOMGHG was then used to examine the effects of storage costs.  In turn, 
it was found that storage cost consideration reduces marginal abatement with levels that 
vary depending on the level of the carbon dioxide equivalent price although the results 
were generally small.  The cheaper outdoor storage method is slightly more competitive 
than the indoor storage method for lower carbon dioxide equivalent price ranges from 
$20 to $200.  At higher prices, the lower storage loss dominates and indoor storage 
method is more advantageous.  The storage cost inclusion change the portfolio shares of 
the strategies with feedstocks with lower storage requirements or dry matter losses 
increasing relative to those with higher costs/dry matter losses.  However, as the price 
increases, the dry matter loss affects the price more.  For the biomass mitigation strategy, 
except for $200 carbon dioxide equivalent price, the amount of emission reductions 
when considering dry matter loss for both indoor and outdoor systems is larger than that 
when not considering dry matter loss implying the storage systems with dry matter loss 
are more competitive than the storage systems without dry matter loss.  For the total of 
all mitigation strategies, except for $20 carbon dioxide equivalent price, the total amount 
of emission reductions when considering dry matter loss in both indoor and outdoor 
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storage systems is larger than the total amount of emission reductions without dry matter 
loss implying storage systems with dry matter loss were slightly more advantageous than 
without dry matter loss.   
          These findings could provide information for policy makers regarding to the 
desirableness of pursuing reductions in GHGs by using biomass for bioenergy. 
          The results of this study illustrate the need to include all costs of the mitigation of 
GHG emissions when designing policies or promoting mitigation alternatives.  The 
changes to total GHG emissions when the effects of transaction and storage costs are 
included are small.  However, the portfolio of optimal GHG mitigation alternatives is 
significantly affected, especially, under limited eligibility.  Also, biomass dry matter 
losses during storage affect emission reductions as the carbon dioxide equivalent price 
changes.     
          A limitation of this study is that transaction costs were assumed to be a percentage 
of carbon dioxide equivalent prices.  If the carbon dioxide equivalent price goes up and 
then transaction costs increase as well.  However, there are many reasons for carbon 
dioxide equivalent prices to increase that are unrelated to transaction costs.  Thus, the 
assumption of transaction costs as a percentage of carbon dioxide equivalent prices 
could over or under estimate these costs.  Also, dry matter losses of biomass can easily 
be affected by weather; rainfall, temperature, and wind, etc.  The weather is different 
from state to state in U.S.  Thus, a consideration of the weather impacts on dry matter 
storage losses as they vary across states would be useful. 
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          Future research needs to assess detailed estimates of the transactions costs for each 
of the GHG mitigation alternatives.  Then all transactions costs could be more accurately 
modeled.  Additionally, the reason why the transactions and storage costs and losses had 
such small effects needs further investigation.  Finally future research should consider 
geographically specific weather effects on biomass dry matter storage because of the 
potential impact on the level of emission reductions. 
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